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Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate
Protection
Summary
In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as
well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a
developing and an industrialized region, both of which independently seek to maximize their
utility – a function of private consumption, domestic air quality, and global climate
protection. They do so by distributing their finite expenditures across (1) the aggregate
consumption good, (2) end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, and (3) greenhouse gas
abatement. Based on our analytical findings, we develop two sets of simulations for
China in which we vary the rate of the CDM transfer. The simulations differ by the
assumption of China’s domestic air quality policy – the first assumes a technologystandards policy which fixes a level of end-of-pipe SO2 control, whereas the second
assumes a technology-neutral policy which simply fixes the level of total SO2
emissions.
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1

Introduction

The Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to developing
countries. This fact is employed by opponents to the Kyoto Protocol to stress its inefficiency, since GHG emission mitigation options can regularly be exploited more cheaply
in the developing world. The US which refused to join the Protocol claims for participation of developing countries in international GHG emission reduction efforts. This
claim is rejected by the developing world because of the economic burden which such
efforts would imply. Furthermore, developing countries argue that the industrialized
world is mainly responsible for the current dimension of the global warming threat.
Therefore, it should mainly be the industrialized world’s responsibility to combat global warming.
Yet, the Kyoto Protocol integrates a mechanism which addresses both opponent views.
This mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), allows industrialized
countries to fulfill their GHG abatement obligations partly by mitigating GHG emissions in developing countries, where mitigation options can be exploited in a cheaper
way. The CDM-associated costs of climate protection are borne by the industrialized
world.
“With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great
deal of low-cost abatement options available, China is widely expected as the world’s
number one host country of CDM projects” (Zhang 2006). According to Zhang (2000),
about 60 percent of the total CDM flows in 2010 will go to China. Vennemo et al. (2006)
review various studies assessing the total CDM potential in China and find that the highest CDM-potential estimate is 788 Mt CO2 (based on the assessments by Zhang (1999,
2000)). Therefore, in our analysis we focus on the case where China is the host of CDM
projects, which are initiated by the largest purchaser of CDM credits, i.e. Europe.
The CDM requires that corresponding GHG reductions in the developing world would
not have occurred in the absence of respective emission mitigation policies, i.e. measures
should be additional.
As Dutschke and Michaelowa (2003) point out, there are disputes about the interpretation
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of ‘additionality’.1 In our model, we consider additionality in the way that industrialized
countries pay for an environmental protection technology shift which raises the level of
climate protection. Only the funding of the shift is of interest, not the total funding of the
applied technology, since only the shift is additional. Therefore, the CDM efforts are
represented by subsidization of a climate-friendly technology which would not have been
applied otherwise. More precisely, we consider the shift from technologies exclusively generating local/regional environmental benefits to technologies producing local/regional as
well as global environmental benefits. In our analysis we consider climate policy to be
an impure public good.
The analysis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider effects of transfers, i.e.
income and price effects. The latter can only be induced by means of conditional transfers, like CDM transfers.
In Section 3, we explain in detail why climate policy is an impure public good. We describe the different groups of benefits generated by climate policy, i.e. primary and ancillary benefits. Primary benefits are derived from the pursuit of the primary aim targeted by climate policy, which is climate protection. Ancillary benefits in turn are received from joint effects which were not primarily intended. Such an effect would be the
mitigation of local air pollution which is induced by the climate protection measure.
Because primary benefits are global while ancillary benefits are local or regional, climate policy is an impure public good. Thereafter, we provide a survey of ancillary benefit studies in developing countries.
In Section 4, we develop an analytical model which indicates that there is scope for raising the global climate protection level by means of CDM transfers. The crucial prerequisites for such climate policy level increasing transfers are determined. There may also be
a positive effect of CDM transfers on poverty reduction in the developing world, whose
magnitude depends on the level of transfers received.
In Section 5, we present a simulation model in order to analyze the effect of the choice of
the subsidy rate (or its level) on welfare and poverty (private good consumption) in the developing world. Here, the industrialized world is represented by Europe and the develop1

Dutschke and Michaelowa (2003) stress that financial additionality requires that no public money
that would have been spent anyway to climate-related action in the developing world is relabelled as
CDM effort.
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ing world by China. Furthermore, we analyze which effect the level of the subsidy rate
has on the global climate protection level. In the simulation model, we distinguish two
policy scenarios in China. One scenario depicts a flexible and incentive-compatible environmental policy in China, while the other considers a more rigid scheme where technology standards are set by the environmental policy. In this model, the rigidity of standardsbased environmental regulations will have negative consequences for the Chinese private
consumption level.
Section 6 concludes.

2

The Possible Impacts of Transfers on Climate Protec-

tion Levels
Climate policy is often simply regarded as a pure public good, since nobody can be
excluded from the consumption of climate protection and this consumption exhibits nonrivalry. As Warr (1982, 1983) demonstrates for the case of pure public goods, unconditional transfers have no effect on the public good provision level, or more precisely, in
an interior Nash equilibrium, redistribution of income among agents is neutral. Income
transfers are called neutral if they do neither affect the total public good provision nor
the individual agents’ consumption of private goods. Prior to this, the neutrality result
had already been noticed by Becker (1974).
Kemp (1984) extends Warr’s ‘neutrality theorem’ to the case of more than one public
good. Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) point out that transfers may be neutral
even when there are distortions in the shape of taxes and subsidies on private goods or
factors, strictly local public goods, or on goods that are public to all. Varian (1994)
finds that neutrality may also occur for Stackelberg equilibria. These results suggest that
unconditional income transfers would only cause a redistribution of climate protection activities among countries while leaving the global abatement level, as well as the individual
countries’ welfare, unchanged. Therefore, incentives for development aid in the shape of
unconditional transfers would not exist.
Yet, neutrality may break, if we consider that there exist cost differentials in the production
of public goods (Buchholz and Konrad 1995: 496) like climate policy, corner solutions
(Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986), non-zero conjectures (Sandler and Posnett 1991) and
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impure publicness (Andreoni 1986, 1989, 1990). However, the positive impact of unconditional transfers channeled towards developing countries, i.e. of alleviating poverty in the
developing world, on the provision level of the global public good ‘climate policy’ tends to
be quite weak (Rübbelke 2002).
Therefore, conditional transfers, i.e. payments not only inducing an income effect, tend
to be more attractive. Transfers which are provided conditionally on climate policy efforts in the transfer receptor countries additionally generate a price effect by reducing
the effective price of climate policy from the transfer-receiving countries’ point of view.
Due to the effective price reduction, the production of climate policy becomes more
attractive in these countries. This kind of transfers is in the focus of our paper and is
represented by CDM transfers channeled to the developing world.
Yet, in contrast to many other studies analyzing conditional transfers, our starting point
(before transfers are paid) is a corner solution. By means of conditional transfers, the
climate-protecting countries intend to convince the free-riding nations to participate in
the international climate protection efforts. Hence, we have a starting point similar to
the current Kyoto-situation, where most industrialized countries commit to climate protection, while developing countries are not at all obligated to control their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions.

3 Climate Policy Considered as an Impure Public Good
CDM transfers (if chosen sufficiently high) may induce an increase in private consumption in the receptor country and they simultaneously initiate climate protection measures
conducted by the recipient (see Figure 1). Climate protection measures in turn, provide
pure public as well as private (from an individual country’s point of view) characteristics. Consequently, they can be considered as impure public goods. In the subsequent
sections, individual countries’ decisions on climate policy production will be analyzed in
an impure public good model.

3.1

Characteristics of Climate Policy

The pure public characteristic subsumes the climate-change mitigating effects or the climate protection generated by climate policy. The benefits derived from these effects can be
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enjoyed globally, irrespective of which country abates greenhouse gas emissions. No
country can be excluded from the consumption of climate protection and non-rivalry
in consumption prevails. The benefits resulting from climate protection are called primary benefits of climate policy.
Climate policy also provides some private characteristic with purely local/regional
influence that can be exclusively enjoyed by countries/regions generating climate policy.
So, the reduction of combustion processes also causes a decline in the emissions of local/regional air pollutants like particulates, NOX and SO2. This decline represents a
domestic public good for the inhabitants of the considered country. From the point of
view of the country or region as a whole, the characteristic is private, since the associated benefits are exclusively enjoyed in this country or region. The benefits which
countries enjoy from consuming the domestic public characteristic are the ancillary or
secondary benefits.
Yet, we have to take account of the fact that the ancillary benefits can also be generated independently of climate policy. Desulphurization installations, for example, reduce the emission of SO2 independently of climate policy. So, the higher the level of
such installations, the lower will be the (marginal) ancillary benefits of climate policy.

CDM transfers

private consumption
(poverty)

pure public characteristic:
reduction of CO2 emissions

climate protection
measures

domestic public (private) characteristic:
e.g. reduction of SO2 emissions

ancillary benefits

primary benefits

Figure 1: Characteristics of Climate Policy.
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Furthermore, as Rypdal et al. (2005) point out, there are greenhouse gases which are
not included in the Kyoto Protocol, that generate more regionally confined climate
effects. Hence, the abatement of these gases cannot fully be regarded as a global pure
public good.
On the other hand there exist ancillary benefits that are global. The abatement of the
greenhouse gases CFCs generates an important ancillary benefit by protecting the
ozone layer (Rübbelke 2002: 23). However, throughout we will suppose primary benefits to be global, while ancillary benefits are local or regional.

3.2

Ancillary Benefits in Developing Countries

While in the 1990s the focus of studies investigating ancillary benefits was on those
occurring in industrialized countries, meanwhile a large strand of literature exists that
deals with ancillary benefits in developing countries.2 This subsection provides a short
survey of this literature on ancillary benefits in the developing world.
As can be observed from Table 1, the geographical foci of these studies are heterogeneous although most of them address co-benefits in China. Yet, even the studies for
China have different regional perspectives with diverging results. The analysis by Gielen and Chen (2001) considers Shanghai and it shows that the relevance of no-regret
options - due to ancillary benefits derived from NOX and SO2 emission reductions - is
limited because of significant energy efficiency improvements in Shanghai in recent
years. However, the authors admit that Shanghai seems not to be representative for the
whole of China and that main GHG emission mitigation potential may be located in
the rural areas of China. Nevertheless, in their assessment of ancillary benefits associated with a reduced PM10 emission level, Kan et al. (2004) find results for Shanghai
which illustrate that an effective energy and environmental policy will play an active
role in the reduction of air pollution and the promotion of public health. Aunan et al.
(2004) focus on co-benefits in Shanxi and assess that CO2-reducing abatement options
entail large co-benefits and are highly profitable in a socio-economic sense. Aunan et
al. (2007: 472) argue that a climate protection commitment would provide significant
2

Still the literature on the qualitative implications of ancillary benefits (in contrast to the literature only
assessing those benefits’ size) is small. Among the few exceptions are Lutter and Shogren (2002) who
analyze how these benefits affect emissions permit trading.
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ancillary benefits to China, since climate protection efforts will not only cause a reduction in GHG emissions but also reductions in particles- and NOX-emissions. These
(and other) non-GHG-emission reductions – in turn – will not only improve public
health but will additionally increase agricultural yields. Van Vuuren et al. (2003) also
assess that large co-benefits of climate protection by means of energy efficiency improvement prevail in China.
Study
Aunan et al.
(2003)
Aunan et al.
(2004)
Aunan et al.
(2007)
Bussolo,
O’Connor
(2001)
Cao (2004)

Country Pollutants
(local/regional)
China
PM, SO2, TSP

Model/Approach
comparison of studies that comprise
a bottom-up study, a semi-bottom-up
study and a top down study using a
CGE model
analysis and comparison of six different CO2-abating options
CGE model

China

SO2, Particles

China

NOX, TSP

India

NOX, Particulates,
SO2

CGE model

China

SO2, TSP

Cao, Ho,
Jorgenson
(2008)

China

NOX, Particulates,
SO2

Chen et al.
(2007)
Cifuentes et
al. (2000)
Cifuentes et
al. (2001)

China

technology assessment, sensitivity to
discount rate
integrated modelling approach combining a top-down recursive dynamic CGE model with a bottom-up
electricity sector model
comparison of partial and general
equilibrium MARKAL models
no economic modelling

Dadi et al.
(2000)
Dessus,
O’Connor
(2003)
Dhakal
(2003)
Eskeland,
Xie (1998)
Garbaccio et
al. (2000)

Chile

CO, PM, NOX, SO2

Brazil,
Chile,
Mexico
China

Ozone, Particulates

development of scenarios that estimate the cumulative public health
impacts of reducing GHG emissions
linear programming model

SO2

Chile

CO, Lead, NO2,
Ozone, PM, SO2

CGE model

Nepal

CO, HC, NOX, SO2,
Particles, Lead
NOX, Particulates,
SO2, VOCs
PM, SO2

analysis of long-range energy system scenarios
technology and cost-curve assessment
CGE model

Chile,
Mexico
China
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Gielen, Chen
(2001)
Ho, Nielsen
(2007)
Kan et al.
(2004)
Larson et al.
(2003)

China

NOX, SO2

China

SO2, TSP

MARKAL, technology assessment
and alternative policy scenarios
CGE model

China

Particulates

Shanghai MARKAL model

China

SO2

MARKAL of energy sector; base vs.
advanced technology scenarios for
controlling CO2 and SO2
Thailand Particulates
dynamic recursive CGE model
Mexico CO, HC, NOX, Par- analysis of five pollution control
ticulates, SO2
options in Mexico City
China
PM, SO2
project-by-project analysis

Li (2006)
McKinley et
al. (2005)
Mestl et al.
(2005)
Morgenstern, China
Krupnick,
Zhang
(2004)
O’Connor et China
al. (2003)
Peng (2000) China

SO2

survey of recent banning of coal
burning in small boilers in downtown area of Taiyuan

NOX, SO2, TSP

CGE model

Particulates, SO2

RAINS-Asia for local, and GTAP
for economy-wide effects
four scenarios, use of end-use based
Asia-Pacific Integrated Assessment
Model (AIM/Enduse)

Shrestha,
Malla, Liyanage
(2007)
Smith, Haigler (2008)

Thailand NOX, SO2

Van Vuuren
et al. (2003)
Vennemo et
al. (2006)

China

SO2

China

SO2, TSP

China

sample calculations regarding interventions in the household energy
sector
simulation model
synthesis of a significant body of
research on co-benefits of climate
policy in China
no economic modelling

Wang, Smith China
Particulates, SO2
(1999a,b)
West et al.
Mexico CO, HC, NOX, Par- linear programming model
(2004)
ticulates, SO2
Table 1: Ancillary Benefit Studies Regarding Developing Countries.

However, not only the geographical foci of studies differ but also the considered nonCO2 pollutants and the employed methodologies. Many studies assess co-benefits associated with the mitigation of SO2 and particles reductions. Also, NOX is frequently
included in the analyses. Yet, in their CGE study for Chile, Dessus and O’Connor
(2003) gather a larger basket of pollutants, which includes CO, Lead, NO2, Ozone,
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PM, SO2. In strong contrast, in their study regarding China, Larson et al. (2003) only
investigate ancillary benefits of SO2 mitigation. However, they provide an integrated
analysis and not just a co-benefit assessment. In their analyses dealing with ancillary
effects in the transport sectors in Mexico City and Santiago de Chile, Eskeland and
Xie (1998) provide technology and cost-curve assessments. Cifuentes et al. (2000) do
not apply an economic model, but conduct an aggregate analysis to estimate potential
ancillary benefits in Chile. A CGE model is used by Bussolo and O’Connor (2001) in
order to investigate ancillary benefits in India. Their study estimates the magnitude of
spillovers from limiting growth of greenhouse gas emissions to local air quality and
the health of the urban population.
O’Connor (2000) provides another comparison of different ancillary benefit studies for
developing countries. Ancillary benefits may however be different to those associated
with the mitigation of air pollution. As Sagar (2005) points out climate policy may
contribute immense social-economic benefits to the world’s poor, while CampbellLendrum and Corvalán (2007) stress the implications of climate policy for both, environmental health and equity.

4
4.1

Analytical Model
Countries’ Consumption of Goods

In our model we distinguish between the industrialized and the developing world. The
individual countries belonging to the industrialized or developing world may consume
commodities which have a private good character from each country’s individual point
of view, as well as a commodity which also provides benefits to all the other countries,
i.e., the global public good ‘climate policy’. It is supposed that climate policy’s private
or domestic public characteristic can also be generated independently of the public
characteristic. Countries can consume the following commodities:
Private commodity: Each country group produces an amount y of a marketed goods
bundle whose characteristic is private to each of them (first private characteristic).
Each unit of this marketed private good provides one unit of the good’s characteristic,
so that y denotes the amount of the private commodity as well as the amount of the
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private characteristic generated by this commodity.
Domestic public commodity: Furthermore, each country generates an amount a of a
second commodity (e.g., desulphurisation installation) that is a domestic public good,
i.e., a good whose characteristic (e.g., local air quality improvements) is private to the
consuming country (second private characteristic). Each unit of this domestic public
good provides one unit of its ‘private’ or domestic public characteristic.
Impure public commodity: The third commodity is an impure public good (climate
policy) providing the private characteristic (e.g., local air quality improvements)
which is also produced by the second commodity. It is consumed up to an amount q
and each unit of the public good generates α units of the private characteristic. Therefore, the total amount of the private characteristic is z = a + αq , where αq is the ancillary effect - such as the reduction in conventional air pollution - associated with climate policy. Furthermore, the impure public good provides a characteristic (climate
protection) which is public to all countries. Each unit of the public good generates β
units of the public characteristic. The total amount X of the public characteristic is
equal to the sum of the developing ( x d ) and the industrialized ( xi ) country groups’
provision.
Industrialized Country Developinq Country
Private good 1
yi
Private good 2 or
ai
local (domestic)
public good
Impure (global) public
qi
good
Total domestic public
zi = ai + α i q i
good (env) benefit
Climate benefit
xi = ßiqi
Aggregate (global) climate benefit X = xi + xd

Unit Costs

yd
ad

pyi or pyd
p ia or pda

qd

p iq or p dq

zd = ad + α d q d
xd = ßdqd

α = private benefit produced per unit of the impure public good, q, produced
β = (global) public benefit produced per unit of impure public good, q, produced
s = subsidy rate, the rate at which the industrialized country subsidizes the production of the impure public good in the developing country

Table 2: Notations.
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For simplicity, we aggregate the individual countries by assigning them to one of the
country groups, i.e. the developing or industrialized country group. The private commodity has the unit price py. The domestic public good has the unit costs of pa(a) and
the impure public good has unit costs of pq(q), both of which are functions of their
respective abatement levels. The characteristics are assumed to behave like normal
goods. The parameters which differ in size among countries get an index, where the
index d stands for ‘developing world’ and i indicates the ‘industrialized world’. For
simplicity, we apply ßi = ßd = 1.

4.2

The Developing World’s Maximization Problem

The welfare in both country groups is assumed to depend on the consumption of the
private and public characteristics. Yet, we assume that a corner solution in international climate protection prevails, where the developing world does not contribute to
climate policy, i.e., X = xi . This results from a climate policy level in the industrialized world which provides climate protection in excess of the level demanded by the
poorer developing countries. As Gielen and Chen (2001: 258) stress the order of issues
on the political agenda in developing countries like China is: “First the apparent local
air pollution problems are tackled; next the more distant GHG problem is considered.
Therefore, it is more relevant to study the impact of local air pollution abatement on
GHG emission reduction than vice versa.”
In the maximization of the country groups’ welfare, we apply the Nash assumption
that each group considers the other group’s public good/characteristic provision as
being given.
Furthermore, it is supposed that

pdq ( qd )

αd

> p da (a d ) . This assumption is in line with the

findings by Gielen and Chen (2001: 267). In their conclusions they point out concerning the options of GHG abatement measures with local air pollution co-effects on the one
hand side and local air pollution mitigation measures (without or with limited GHG
benefits) on the other hand side: “The results suggest that dedicated emission abatement
technology (without or with limited GHG benefits) is a more cost-effective way to reduce local air pollution. Examples are 3-way catalysts for cars and IGCC for electricity
production. Such technologies should be considered if secondary benefits are valued”.
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From this starting point, we then assume that the industrialized world offers the developing world a conditional transfer, i.e. it offers to subsidize the developing world’s
production of the impure public good.
Consequently, the developing world’s welfare maximization problem becomes:3

max U d ( y d , z d )

y d , ad , qd

s.t.
I d = pdy ⋅ y d + pda ⋅ ad + (1 − s ) ⋅ pdq ⋅ qd

(1)

z d = ad + α d qd
ad , qd ≥ 0
Id represents the developing country’s national income. The bars above I and py indicate that they are fixed in our model. The rate s is calibrated on initial levels of pq, pa,
q, and a, and is also fixed.
This is associated with the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:

I d = pdy ⋅ yd + pda ⋅ ad + (1 − s) ⋅ pdq ⋅ qd

(2)

∂U d
= λd ⋅ pdy
∂y d

(3)

⎡ ∂U d
∂U d
∂ ( p da ⋅ a d )
∂ ( p da ⋅ a d ) ⎤
≤ λd ⋅
− λd ⋅
, a d ≥ 0, a d ⎢
⎥=0
∂a d
∂a d
∂
∂
a
a
d
⎣ d
⎦

(4)

⎡ ∂U
∂U d
∂ ( p dq ⋅ q d )
∂ ( p dq ⋅ q d ) ⎤
, q d ≥ 0, q d ⎢ d − λ d (1 − s )
≤ λ d ⋅ (1 − s ) ⋅
⎥=0
∂q d
∂q d
∂q d
⎦
⎣ ∂q d

(5)

The variable λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the income constraint.

4.3

The Industrialized World’s Maximization Problem

The industrialized country faces no public characteristic provision in excess of its demand. The maximization problem of the industrialized world is given by:
3

We suppose that the developing world disregards the public characteristic in its reasoning. This is due
to the assumptions that the industrialized world provides – throughout – this characteristics in excess of
the developing world’s demand and that the developing world takes xi as given. See Rübbelke (2006)
for a similar approach.

14
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper252

14

Rübbelke and Rive: Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate

max U i ( y i , z i , X )

y i , ai , q i , q d

s.t .
I i = p iy ⋅ y i + p ia ⋅ a i + p iq ⋅ q i + s ⋅ p dq ⋅ q d

(6)

X = qi + q d
z i = ai + α i qi
ai , qi , q d ≥ 0
The optimization problem yields the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the industrialized region:

I i = piy ⋅ yi + pia ⋅ ai + piq ⋅ qi + s ⋅ pdq ⋅ qd

(7)

∂U i
= λi ⋅ piy
∂yi

(8)

⎡ ∂U
∂U i
∂ ( pia ⋅ ai )
∂ ( pia ⋅ ai ) ⎤
≤ λi ⋅
, ai ≥ 0, ai ⎢ i − λi ⋅
⎥=0
a
a
∂ai
∂ai
∂
∂
i
⎣ i
⎦

(9)

⎡ ∂U
∂U i
∂ ( piq ⋅ qi )
∂ ( piq ⋅ qi ) ⎤
≤ λi ⋅
, qi ≥ 0, qi ⎢ i − λi ⋅
⎥=0
q
q
∂qi
∂qi
∂
∂
i
⎣ i
⎦

(10)

⎡ ∂U
∂ ( p dq ⋅ q d ) ⎤
∂U i
∂ ( p dq ⋅ q d )
≤ λi ⋅ s ⋅
, q d ≥ 0, q d ⎢ i − λi ⋅ s ⋅
⎥=0
q
q
∂q d
∂q d
∂
∂
d
⎣ d
⎦

(11)

4.4

Conditions for the Acceptance of Transfers

Each region has its own demands regarding the acceptability of CDM activity; this can
be seen in equations (5) and (11). The industrial region will accept the CDM as long as
the following condition is satisfied:

∂U i
∂ ( p dq ⋅ q d )
≥ λi ⋅ s ⋅
∂q d
∂q d

(12)

The developing region will accept the region as long as:

∂U d
∂ ( pdq ⋅ qd )
≥ λd ⋅ (1 − s) ⋅
∂qd
∂qd

(13)
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In equilibrium, only one of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to qd shall be binding,
and the lowest acceptable level of s will prevail. This is generally associated with the
developing region’s condition. As such, we drop the industrialized region’s KuhnTucker condition related to qd (equation (11)), and replace it with equation (12). The
combination of equations (5) and (12) ensures that both regions are satisfied with the
CDM subsidy arrangement.

5

Simulation Model

Conditional transfers may improve the outcome: developing countries may enjoy a
higher regional environmental quality and both, industrialized and developing countries may enjoy a mitigation of the global warming threat. The effect on poverty reduction, i.e. increase in private consumption, in the developing world crucially depends on
the level of transfers received. Part of these transfers may not be conditionally employed and could be used by the developing world for additional consumption of the
private good yD . In order to analyze the effect of the level of the subsidy rate on poverty or private good consumption in the developing world, we conduct a simulation
study. We also analyze the effects of changing transfer rates on global climate protection and local/regional air quality levels.

5.1

European Funds Transferred to China

We apply the theoretical framework to a simulation model based around empirical
data. For this illustrative example, we focus on CDM transfers between Europe4 (the
largest purchaser of CDM credits) and China (the largest provider of CDM credits),
and the impact on SO2 emissions in both regions in 2010. Europe and China take the
roles as developed and developing regions respectively, although we also account for
CO2-reducing measures in the rest of the world.
Functional Forms
It is assumed that our regions have utility functions of the form:

U i = γ 1i ln yi + γ 2i ln zi + γ 3i ln X
4

(14)

European Union plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.
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U d = γ 1d ln yd + γ 2 d ln z d

(15)

In addition, the average price functions are assumed to take the following form (using
pda as an example):

pda ( ad ) = Aad2 + Bad + C

(16)

The coefficients are determined for each price function using region-specific data described below.
Empirical Data
We assemble appropriate consumption and abatement data in order to obtain initial
values and to calibrate our model. A key source is the CICERO GRACE model (Aaheim and Rive 2005), which is aggregated to include China, Europe, and the Rest of
World. The business as usual (BAU) GRACE scenario broadly follows the SRES B2
(IPCC 2000) scenario to 2010.
The initial budget constraint (I) is taken from the BAU GRACE scenario.
Region
Europe
China

Budget 2010 (Trillion $)
20
6.36

Table 3: Budgets.
The GRACE model is also used to obtain the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve
for CO2 abatement in Europe. This marginal abatement curve is obtained by calculating the permit price and abatement quantities for increasingly stringent CO2 reduction
targets, as is done by Ellerman and Decaux (1998), within the current group of EUETS (emissions trading scheme) sectors.5
The marginal abatement cost curve for China is not calculated in the GRACE model,
as the model does not reflect the transaction and uncertainty costs involved with
CDM-type projects. As such, a simplistic linear MAC curve is assumed for the CDM
transfers between China and Europe, using the $7-14/tCO2 range of CER prices in
recent years.
The marginal abatement costs for SO2 abatement are calculated from separate models,
5

The sectors are: power plants, cement, paper and pulp, iron and steel, and oil refining.
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as GRACE does not feature treatment for emissions control technologies. MAC curves
for SO2 abatement in Europe and China are calculated using the RAINS-Online
(Amann et al. 2004) and GAINS-Asia (Klaassen et al. 2006) models respectively. The
MAC curves are for the year 2010, for ‘current legislation’ (CLE) assumptions about
pollution control and moderate economic growth.
These four MAC curves are converted into average abatement cost curves, characterized by the coefficients as per equation (16). The coefficients for each curve are shown
in Table 4 below, with the average prices given in $/tSO2 or $/tCO2 abated, under abatement levels denominated in MtSO2 or MtCO2.
Curve/Coefficient
Europe CO2
Europe SO2
China CO2
China SO2

A
0
57.4
0
0.268

B
0.0467
-450
0.0989
-27.4

C
1.06
1140
7.0
765

Table 4: Coefficients.
Calibrating the model for European and Chinese CO2 and SO2 abatement, of course,
depends on assumptions about climate policy (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol), air quality policy, and how Europe’s CO2 reductions are distributed between domestic and CDM
abatement. Initial SO2 abatement levels in Europe and China are taken from the CLE
abatement levels in the RAINS-Online and GAINS-Asia, using the ‘no control’ levels
as a starting point. In order to meet its Kyoto target, Europe must reduce its CO2 emissions from the GRACE BAU 2010 level by 8.5% or 326 MtCO2.6 If we assume that all
domestic abatement will be undertaken within the EU-ETS sectors, and future allocations will keep the domestic permit price to 20 $/tCO2, the GRACE MAC curve suggests that only 203 MtCO2 of this will be abated at home. This leaves a shortfall of
123 MtCO2 that must come from CDM credits. At face value, this appears to be a reasonable assumption given that the UNEP CDM Pipeline database predicts 300 MtCO2
of CDM credits will be available in 2010 (Fenhann 2008).
Yet China and Europe are involved in numerous CDM transactions, and not all of
them are of particular interest here. In this paper, we are primarily interested in CDM
transactions between the two regions related to combustion-based CO2 emissions.
6

Assuming all Eastern European hot air is allowed.
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However, Europe will likely purchase credits from F-gas and N2O projects in China,
and it will also likely buy credits from other regions at the same time. In addition,
China will likely be selling credits to other regions. Of course, it is impossible to predict the distribution of project types in Europe’s and China’s transactions. As such, we
simply assume that it simply follows the broad distribution of projects already featured
in the CDM projects that are registered and under validation. We take these additional
transaction expenditures into account by adding them as fixed parameters into Europe’s and China’s budget constraints (equations (2) and (7) above).
Finally, we must account for climate policy in the other Annex B countries having
ratified the Kyoto Protocol such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Russia, and Japan. These countries will also reduce their emissions via a mix of domestic and
CDM/JI abatement measures. Their abatement is included in the model as a fixed parameter contributing to the total CO2 abatement level X.
These parameters are presented below in Table 5.
MtSO2 or MtCO2

Initial Abatement (2010)
SO2 Targets
Europe
China

7.3
100

Kyoto Targets
Europe
Other Annex B

326
380

Europe CER Purchases
Combustion CDM from China
All other CERs

36
87

China CER Sales
Combustion CDM to Europe
All other CERs

36
120

Table 5: Fixed Parameters.
The initial marginal costs of abatement are presented below in Table 6.
Parameter [units]
pa [$/tSO2]
pq [$/tCO2]

Europe
3750
20

China
3300
14

Table 6: Marginal Abatement Costs.
The alpha (α) variable in the model represents the rate at which SO2 is reduced jointly
with CO2 reduction. The European value is taken from a previous paper by Löschel

19
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 252 [2009]

and Rübbelke (2009), whereas the China value is taken from unpublished calculations
undertaken by the authors.
Alpha (α)
EU-17
China

kgSO2/tCO2 abated
1
3

Table 7: Values for α.
The final step of the calibration is to calculate the initial consumption (y) levels, and
the subsidy rate for CDM expenditures. These are shown below in Table 8.
Parameter
Europe Consumption (Trillion $)
China Consumption (Trillion $)
Subsidy rate (s)

Initial Value
20
6.29
0.29

Table 8: Initial Consumption Levels and the Subsidy Rate.

5.2

Simulation Results

By our model, we assess the impact of the subsidy rate (s) paid by Europe for combustion CO2-based CDM projects in China on utility, consumption, emissions control, and
prices. We undertake two sets of simulations, within both of which we incrementally
vary the level of s. Each set differs, however, in how China is assumed to achieve its
domestic SO2 goals. The first simulation set is assumed to be technology-specific,
keeping the use of end-of-pipe technologies (a) fixed. The second set, however, is
technology-neutral, and merely keeps the total level of SO2 emissions (z) constant.
Our interest is how these approaches may impact our results. The results are presented
in Figures 2 and 3 below. It is seen that, as expected, the level of global CO2 abatement (X) increases with an increased subsidy under both simulations.
Under both simulations, the level of utility in China rises with increasing subsidy rates.
The sign of the impact of rising subsidy rates on consumption depends acutely on the
policy approach assumed for air quality in China. Under a standards-driven policy,
where end-of-pipe abatement technology usage is fixed, consumption actually falls
under increased CDM subsidy rates. The opposite is the case for the technologyneutral policy.

20
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper252

20

Rübbelke and Rive: Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate

1,000035
l 1,00003
e
v
e
l 1,000025
e
n
li 1,00002
e
s
a 1,000015
b
to 1,00001
e
v
it 1,000005
a
l
1
e
r
e 0,999995
u
la
V 0,99999

2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5

0,999985

l
e
v
e
l
e
n
li
e
s
a
b
to
e
v
it
a
l
e
r
e
u
la
V

y (China, left axis))
u (China, left axis)
q (China, right axis)
X(right axis)

0
0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

Subsidy (s) level relative to the baseline level

Figure 2: Change in global CO2 reduction (x), and consumption (y), utility (u), and
CO2 emissions abatement in China (q) under changes to the CDM subsidy level.
Technology-neutral domestic air quality policy assumed with a fixed SO2 emissions
level.
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Figure 3: Change in global CO2 reduction (x), and consumption (y), utility (u), and
CO2 (q) and SO2 (z) emission abatement in China under changes to the CDM subsidy
level. Technology-standards-driven domestic air quality policy assumed.
The reason for this is that under the standards-driven policy, China does not have the
flexibility to take advantage of the air quality co-benefits of the CDM and substitute
between end-of-pipe and CDM contributions to SO2 reductions. Under the technologyneutral policy (where only the level of SO2 emissions is mandated) and higher CDM
subsidies, China can reduce its expenditures on end-of-pipe technologies – affording it
higher levels of consumption. This result is in line with much of the market-based environmental policy literature in the recent decades. To take maximal advantage of the
co-benefits of CDM, a flexible technology-neutral air quality policy (such as emis-
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sions trading or taxes) is thus advisable.

6

Concluding Remarks

The importance of environmental sustainability for poverty mitigation is frequently
stressed. The seventh UN Millennium Development Goal, for example, calls for the
integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and to reverse the loss of environmental resources. Such a strategy of linking
two policy issues, i.e. environmental protection and poverty eradication, is considered
in this paper. However, we not only consider the impact of an improved environment
on the welfare of poor countries, but also the effects of international environmental
measures on private consumption in developing countries. Increases in welfare and
private consumption levels can both be regarded as a mitigation of poverty.
The international protection measures analyzed here are CDM transfers channeled
from the industrialized to the developing world. More precisely, we investigated the
influence of transfers from Europe, which is currently the largest purchaser of CDM
credits, towards China, which is the largest provider of CDM credits, on changing the
technology application in China. We observed the effects on poverty (welfare and private consumption levels) in China as well as on China’s and the whole world’s climate
protection levels.
The results show how industrialized countries can positively influence the consumption level by raising the transfers to the developing world. There may be a range of
transfer levels which is profitable for both parties. In the example we have considered,
with CO2 and SO2 emissions, we find that a rise in the transfer level within this range
will have different impacts, depending on the kind of SO2 regulation in China.
Our results suggest that this type of development aid will be more effective at increasing private consumption in the receptor country if its domestic environmental policy is
implemented in a flexible and incentive compatible way. In our example, this is the
case when China stipulates the abatement target (z), but not the level (a) of end-of-pipe
technology application for SO2 control. CDM transfers towards developing countries
that base their environmental regulations mainly on command-and-control instruments
like the implementation of technological standards will likely have a lower poverty-
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mitigating impact (in the sense of raising private consumption). As highlighted in the
previous section, this advantage is a result of the flexibility afforded by a technologyneutral policy; developing countries will take advantage of the co-benefits of the CDM
by paring down their application of end-of-pipe technologies, which in turn will allow
for more private consumption. This is in line with the preference in the literature for
market-based environmental policy (such as taxes or permits) over a technologydriven approach.
When it comes to the impact of the transfer level on global climate protection, our
results suggest that the higher the level of the subsidy rate the higher the global climate
protection level under both options for domestic environmental policy. Climate protection appears to increase slightly more under the flexible regulation option, albeit with
only a 1.5% advantage.
Both environmental regulation scenarios offer positive welfare (u) responses to increasing CDM transfer rates in our model. Yet, the CDM transfers actually caused a decline
in private consumption if China applied a technology-specific policy.
At first sight, the consumption and climate protection results may appear to contradict
the assumption that positive environmental protection and poverty mitigation (via increased consumption) always go hand in hand. We find that the most advantageous outcome from a consumption perspective may not be the same as the one from a climate
perspective.
We must, however, note that the negative consumption impact in our technologyspecific scenario occurs within a model where SO2 emission reductions are the only cobenefit of climate policy. If we were to expand the co-benefits into additional pollutants
(NOx, PM) and effects (such as energy cost savings and energy security) it might be the
case that both technology-specific and technology-neutral scenarios will feature positive
consumption impacts of increased subsidies. Energy savings, for example, will allow for
more consumption on other goods and services. In such a case, environmental protection
and consumption would increase simultaneously. However, what our model effectively
demonstrates is the importance of co-benefits in environmental policy analysis and design.
In future extensions of this work, it would be interesting to add complexity to the model
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by including additional pollutants and ancillary effects, and by linking consumption levels to pollution. Another important extension of the analysis would be the investigation
of distributional effects within China, e.g. of the question whether the change in private
consumption would mainly improve the well-being of the poor or of the rich in China.
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